Que signifie pour Kant l'erreur de Leibniz? Autour de l'«Amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion»

Kant Studien 101 (1):1-21 (2010)
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Abstract

For Kant, «reflection», the logical action that consists in elaborating concepts, also means, when it is «transcendental», the action of distinguishing within our knowing what belongs to each of the two sources of our representations – sensibility and understanding. In that respect, reflection is a central notion in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. But it is also essential to the understanding of Kant's relation to classical philosophy. Indeed, in the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled «Amphiboly of concepts of reflection», Kant takes a simultaneous stand on Leibniz and Locke, as he assignes them two symmetrical errors: according to Kant, Leibniz «intellectualized phenomena», while Locke «sensualised the concepts of the understanding». The present paper proposes to demonstrate how the reproach adressed to Leibniz might constitute an original approach for the interpretation of the problematic relation established in the Critique of Pure Reason between sensibility and understanding

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