Abstract

Many scholars have claimed that a well-known, allegedly ‘Rylean’ passage in DA I.4 shows that Aristotle does not think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. However, other scholars have argued against this and invoked other texts to support their rival claim that Aristotle does think souls are subjects of mental states and activities. This article articulates and defends an original interpretation of Aristotle’s position vis-à-vis this issue. In particular, this article argues that Aristotle thinks the souls of living corporeal substances are ‘things that underlie’ (i.e., ὑποκɛίμɛνα for) various non-substantial features of the substances to which they belong, including whatever mental capacities those substances have. However, this does not entail that he thinks souls literally have the features they underlie, as if they themselves were alive and could engage in the kinds of mental activities (seeing, hearing, desiring, thinking, reasoning, etc.) that animals and humans can. In fact, there is good reason to think Aristotle does not think souls literally engage in such activities, despite his sometimes writing in a loose manner that suggests they do.