Abstract

In this paper I put forward the thesis that relevant so called ontological notions in the Monadology have to be reformulated as logical ones to understand them reasonably. Consequently the Monadology turns into an outline of “logical hermeneutics”: instead of the traditional disjunction between (recognizing) subjects and (recognizable) objects Leibniz is suggested to articulate a relation only between subjects. These (logical) subjects, resp. monads, are defined by their perceptions to which, terminologically spoken, the predicates of the complete concept correspond to. Perceptions are called the 'internal determinations' of a monad expressing the composite which, correspondingly, functions as their 'external determinations'. The reasonable 'higher' monads (man) then constitute world and, thereby, a concept of their own by reflecting upon their perceptions, i.e. by apperception as Leibniz says. The idea of God at last means the postulate to conclude the rational selfknowledge, and, at the same time, knowledge of objects. For He has the complete concept of all monads in mind, and for Him the indefinite conjunction of predicates defining a monad really expresses the whole composite