Abstract
Many philosophers attribute extraordinary importance to the idea of natural kinds seemingly intimating that the very possibility of certain kinds of activity are ontologically beholden to the existence of kinds. Specifically, regarding chemistry, Brian Ellis intimated that the success of any plausible metaphysical essentialism depends upon its “reliance on examples from chemistry.” Ellis’s view is representative of a tradition in analytic philosophy that has utilized chemical examples as paradigmatic natural kinds. In this regard, Kripke and Putnam emerge as the architects of an entrenched research program dedicated to the chemical tradition of natural kinds in analytic philosophy. The emergence of a critical body of literature by philosophers of chemistry and others has shattered the complacent reliance upon chemical examples as exemplary kinds. On the basis of this emerging critical literature, I will critically explore the way in which chemical practice and inquiry affects the natural kind debate. So, instead of the pretense that we simply carve nature at its joints, we need to become better grounded in the practice of science, and especially with regard to the debate about natural kinds in chemical practice. Consistent with this orientation, we need to make the practice turn, that is, eradicate the fantasy of logical reconstruction and become involved with the interpretative and historical challenges of understanding the nuances of practice. The point here is quite clear, metaphysical questions regarding natural kind should be imminent to scientific practice. Indeed, any legitimate metaphysics of natural kinds should be appropriately informed and grounded in practice and not operate on the basis of a priori sovereignty. I will insert this critical discussion within the analytical context of the notion of interpretive communities and make the case that philosophers should not assume that appeals to the purity of philosophy can substitute for the complexity and practical orientation of chemical practice.