Abstract

The focus of the present study is the critical evaluation of the philosophical foundations of four major theories of truth. The theories considered are the correspondence, pragmatic, coherence, and revealment theories respectively, and a historical approach is employed to elucidate and evaluate their central tenets. A concluding chapter explores the relevance and applicability of these conceptions of truth to the domain of contemporary scientific inquiry. More specifically, the structure of the dissertation is as follows. ;Chapter one focuses on the contributions of Aristotle and Aquinas, respectively, to the resolution of the central problem of the correspondence theory--that of detailing the nature and origin of the agreement between thought and thing. The effect of Kant's "Copernican revolution" on the traditional understanding of truth as correspondence is also considered. ;Chapter two analyzes the foundations of William James' pragmatic theory of truth. This account, we find, is motivated by the attempt to explain the truth relation in concrete experiential terms, and to emphasize personal and contextual factors in our appropriation of truth. The residual problem here is whether this theory can adequately explain the objectivity of the truth relation. ;Chapter three focuses on Brand Blanshard's contention that coherence is the sole criterion of truth, and that coherence, therefore, defines the meaning of truth. In criticizing aspects of Blanshard's position, the present study urges a more moderate and traditional understanding of the scope and limitations of the coherence theory. ;Chapter four considers Heidegger's attempt to radically rethink the question of truth. The emphasis here is on elucidating the significance of Heidegger's conclusion that "the essence of truth is the truth of essence." Some attention is also given to the relationship between the Heideggerian and correspondence theories. ;The concluding chapter of this dissertation seeks to establish that the pursuit of truth is central not only to the task of philosophy but also to that of empirical science. Towards this end, we first consider the role of a concept of truth vis-avis several competing schools of scientific thought. Thereafter, we indicate how each of the theories of truth previously considered relates to the scientific domain as such