Abstract

Can an artificially intelligent tool be a part of a human’s extended mind? There are two opposing streams of thought in this regard. One of them can be identified as the externalist perspective in the philosophy of mind, which tries to explain complex states and processes of an individual as co-constituted by elements of the individual’s material and social environment. The other strand is normative and explanatory atomism which insists that what is to be explained and evaluated is the behaviour of individuals. In the present contribution, it is argued that counterintuitive results turn up once atomism tries to appropriate insights from psychological externalism and holism. These results are made visible by technological innovations, especially artificially intelligent systems, but they do not result from these innovations alone. They are rather implicit in situated cognition approaches which join both theoretical strands. This has repercussions for explanatory as well as ethical theorising based on situated cognition approaches. It is a fairly rare constellation that new technological options, namely artificial intelligence, raise doubts concerning a philosophical theory, namely extended mind theory.