Phenomenology of 'authentic time' in Husserl and Heidegger

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):327 – 347 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his dialogue the Timaeus, Plato recognized two aspects of time, the past and the future, but not the present. In contrast, Aristotle's analysis of time in the Physics took its orientation from the 'now'. It is the latter path that Husserl follows with his conception of the 'original impression' (Urimpression). However, in certain parts of Husserl's Bernau Manuscripts, the present loses significance because of a novel interpretation of protention. This development, which revitalizes Plato's understanding of time, is furthered in Heidegger's late lecture Time and Being: the present can be understood on the basis of the 'withdrawal' which determines the mutual relation between the arrival as authentic future and the having-been as authentic past.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,676

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

From the question of time to the time of questioning : husserl and the ambiguity of time.Sai Hang Kwok - 2017 - Dissertation, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger.Tina Chanter - 2001 - Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Husserl, Protention, and the Phenomenology of the Unexpected.Jack Blaiklock - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):467-483.
How Does the Future Appear in Spite of the Present? Towards an “Empty Teleology” of Time.Daniel Neumann - 2023 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 54 (1):15-29.
Aristotle on Parts of Time and Being in Time.Nathanael Stein - 2016 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (3):495-518.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
183 (#131,773)

6 months
10 (#394,677)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references