Abstract

For Proclus, like other Platonists, logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language are not distinct as a tool and parts of philosophy respectively, but are all part of dialectic. This chapter first briefly addresses Proclus’ logic, specifically the ‘rule of obversion’ ascribed to him, and his naturalist philosophy of language, and thereafter moves on to epistemology. The author discusses Proclus’ top-down psychology, where the highest faculty is the paradigm for the lower ones; the Iamblichean principle that knower determines knowledge; the essential reason-principles, or lower forms constituting the soul’s essence; Proclus’ rich notion of recollection; his solutions to two challenges to his epistemology: the knowledge of things of which there is no Form, and the use of images in cognition. Finally, in the conclusion the author assesses Proclus’ originality and discusses the fact that for late Neoplatonists knowledge is not an end in itself.