The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination

In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2013)
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Abstract

Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".

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10.7551/mitpress/9780262019200.003.0008

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Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.
Does Hallucinating involve Perceiving?Rami Ali - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):601-627.

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References found in this work

Either / or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94.
Indiscriminability and the phenomenal.Susanna Siegel - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.
Disjunctivism.John Hawthorne & Karson Kovakovich - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
Disjunctivism about visual experience.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143.

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