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(Regrettably) Abortion remains immoral: The impairment argument defended
Bioethics 33 (8):968-969 (2019)
Abstract
In my article "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The impairment argument" (this journal), I defended what I called “The impairment argument” which purports to show that abortion is immoral. Bruce Blackshaw (2019) has argued that my argument fails on three accounts. In this article, I respond to his criticisms.Author's Profile
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The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion revisited.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2019 - Bioethics (Online):211-213.
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Citations of this work
Strengthening the impairment argument against abortion.Bruce Blackshaw & Perry Hendricks - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (7):515-518.
Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks.Joona Räsänen - 2020 - Bioethics 34 (8):862–864.
Fine-Tuning the Impairment Argument.Bruce Philip Blackshaw & Perry Hendricks - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (9):641-642.
The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion revisited.Bruce P. Blackshaw - 2019 - Bioethics (Online):211-213.
Against the strengthened impairment argument: never-born fetuses have no FLO to deprive.Alex R. Gillham - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics (12):1-4.
References found in this work
Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral: The impairment argument.Perry Hendricks - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (2):245-253.
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