The rule of adjunction and reasonable inference

Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):109-125 (1997)
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Citations of this work

Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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