More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 27 (3):335-344 (2012)
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Abstract

Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang ( 2012 ) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006 ). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, we use an important yet overlooked distinction between truthmakers and determiners to help drive this point home

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Author Profiles

Charles Hermes
University of Texas at Arlington
J. Campbell
Georgia Southern University

Citations of this work

Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Free Will. Blackwell.
Truthmakers and the Direct Argument.Charles Hermes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):401-418.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.

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