Knowledge‐That as How‐Knowledge

In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 169–218 (2011)
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Knowing How it is that p How‐Knowledge that p and Gradualism Degrees of Knowledge and Degrees of Belief How‐Knowledge that p and Truthmakers Knowledge that p and Gradualism Knowledge‐Gradualism's Central Concept Can there be Minimal Knowledge? Minimal Knowledge as Foundational Knowledge Knowledge‐Gradualism: Closure and Scepticism Knowledge‐Gradualism: Content Externalism and Self‐Knowledge How not to Argue for Knowledge‐Absolutism Linguistic Evidence: Igor Douven Linguistic Evidence: Jason Stanley How‐Knowledge‐how that p Knowing as Understanding?

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

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