On Block's delineation of the border between seeing and thinking

Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):1358-1366 (2024)
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Abstract

This note is concerned with Ned Block's claim that cognition differs from perception in being paradigmatically conceptual, propositional, and non-iconic. As against Block, it maintains that large stretches of cognition constitutively involve, or depend on, iconic representations.

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Christopher Hill
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

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Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Between perception and thought.Jacob Beck - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (1):294-301.

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