Is Strict Coherence Coherent?

Dialectica 66 (3):411-424 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Bayesians have a seemingly attractive account of rational credal states in terms of coherence. An agent's set of credences are synchronically coherent just in case they conform to the probability calculus. Some Bayesians impose a further putative coherence constraint called regularity: roughly, if X is possible, then it is assigned positive probability. I look at two versions of regularity – logical and metaphysical – and I canvass various defences of it as a rationality norm. Combining regularity with synchronic coherence, we have a set of constraints known as strict coherence.I argue that strict coherence is untenable. In particular, I attack regularity as a rationality norm. First, I rebut each of the various defences of regularity. Then I argue directly against regularity: it conflicts with the Bayesian decision‐theoretic treatment of rational action. Thus, seemingly plausible theoretical and pragmatic norms turn out to be inconsistent.[Barbossa is about to kill Will,but Jack Sparrow shows up:]Barbossa: It's not possible!Jack: Not probable.To be uncertain is to be uncomfortable,but to be certain is to be ridiculous

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,601

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-21

Downloads
81 (#261,756)

6 months
5 (#1,094,893)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alan Hajek
Australian National University

Citations of this work

The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (1):1-32.
Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Infinitesimal Probabilities.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 199-265.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references