Mises redux-redux : fifteen arguments against finite frequentism

In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 209 - 227 (2010)
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Abstract

According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position

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original Hájek, Alan (1996) "“Mises redux” — Redux: Fifteen arguments against finite frequentism". Erkenntnis 45(2-3):209--27

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Alan Hajek
Australian National University

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