Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy

Acta Analytica 36 (4):1-10 (2021)
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Abstract

According to an important analogy between knowledge and action, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, intention aims at action just as belief aims at knowledge. This paper investigates the analogy and discusses three difficulties that it has to face. The key is to distinguish between two different norms of intention and to see that the knowledge-action analogy is concerned with one of them only, namely, the realization norm: one ought to intentionally act if one intends to act in a certain way. A modification will be proposed that replaces intention by correct intention, and some work will be done with the aim of uncovering a frame for how to properly understand the analogy and what it ultimately is grounded on, namely, the normativity of capacities that are in the business of generating various states and of realizing one’s correct intentions. Thus, a modified knowledge-action analogy will be vindicated in the end.

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Citations of this work

The norm of reasoning.Frank Hofmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-18.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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