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Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Don’t Fear the Reductionist Bogey-man
Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):138-144 (2018)
Abstract
Shaun Gallagher calls for a radical rethinking of the concept of nature and he resists reduction of phenomenology to computational-neural science. However, classic, reductionist science, at least in contemporary computational guise, has the resources to accommodate insights from transcendental phenomenology. Reductionism should be embraced, not feared.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential.Inês Hipólito - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):184-188.
Agency and the Metaphysics of Nature.Andrew Sims - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):194-198.
Phenomenology and Cognitive Neuroscience: Can a Process Ontology Help Resolve the Impasse?Ross Pain - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):204-208.
Phenomenology, Naturalism and Non-reductive Cognitive Science.Jack Alan Reynolds, Cathy Legg, Sean Bowden & Patrick Stokes - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):119-124.
References found in this work
Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind.Andy Clark - 2015 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.
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