The experience of mental causation

Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

subjects mean when they report their mental states it is useful to be guided by a sound grasp of their concepts for mental events. <sup>3</sup> Though this is often ignored in favor of libertarian notions of free will, in which free action is seen as completely undetermined by the subject

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
772 (#31,392)

6 months
84 (#74,353)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jakob Hohwy
Monash University

Citations of this work

The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems.Barbara Tomczyk - 2024 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (4):579-604.
Too much or too little? Disorders of agency on a spectrum.Valentina Petrolini - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):5-12.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references