Does Moral Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent?

In Roger Crisp, How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1998)
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Abstract

Theories of individual well‐being fall into three main categories: hedonism, the desire‐fulfilment theory, and the list theory (which maintains that there are some things that can benefit a person without increasing the person's pleasure or desire‐fulfilment). The paper briefly explains the answers that hedonism and the desire‐fulfilment theory give to the question of whether being virtuous constitutes a benefit to the agent. Most of the paper is about the list theory's answer.

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2010-10-07

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Brad Hooker
University of Reading

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