Abstract

It is not surprising that when we get down to the basics about policies, laws, permissions, and restrictions on biotechnological enhancement, the question is quickly framed this way: Do we have a fundamental right to biotechnologically enhance ourselves? We live in a culture – largely worldwide – whose moral deliberations are dominated by the modern discourse of rights. This was not always the case and it does not have to be the case now. Instead of deciding what we should do, or be allowed to do, by asking whether we have a fundamental “right” to something, we might instead ask whether that something is good, or whether it is intelligible, or whether it is rational, or healthy, or virtuous, or tending toward edification, or commanded by God, or granted under a social contract. But we do ask the question in terms of rights. As the announcement of the conference which prompted this paper says: Defenders of enhancement argue that the use of biotechnologies is a fundamental human right, inseparable from the defense of bodily autonomy, reproductive freedom, free expression and cognitive liberty … defenders of enhancement believe that bans on the consensual use of new technologies would be an even greater threat to human rights