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Analytical moral functionalism meets moral twin earth
In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 221--236 (2009)
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Analytical moral functionalism meets moral twin earth.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 221.
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Analytic moral functionalism meets moral twin earth.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 221.
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Citations of this work
Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.
Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.
The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.
Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-110.
Are normative properties descriptive properties?Bart Streumer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.
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