Boolean-Valued Sets as Arbitrary Objects

Mind 133 (529):143-166 (2024)
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Abstract

This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.

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References found in this work

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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.

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