Tarski's theorem and liar-like paradoxes

Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (1):24-38 (2014)
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Abstract

Tarski's theorem essentially says that the Liar paradox is paradoxical in the minimal reflexive frame. We generalise this result to the Liar-like paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ for all ordinal $\alpha\geq 1$. The main result is that for any positive integer $n = 2^i(2j+1)$, the paradox $\lambda^n$ is paradoxical in a frame iff this frame contains at least a cycle the depth of which is not divisible by $2^{i+1}$; and for any ordinal $\alpha \geq \omega$, the paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ is paradoxical in a frame iff this frame contains at least an infinite walk which has an arbitrarily large depth. We thus get that $\lambda^n$ has a degree of paradoxicality no more than $\lambda^m$ iff the multiplicity of 2 in the (unique) prime factorisation of $n$ is no more than that in the prime factorisation of $m$; and all tranfinite $\lambda^\alpha$ has the same degree of paradoxcality but has a higher degree of paradoxicality than any $\lambda^n$.

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Ming Hsiung
Zhongshan University

Citations of this work

What Paradoxes Depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.
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Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach.Ming Hsiung - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (4):739-789.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.

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