Abstract

This essay is about some remarks of G. E. M. Anscombe's concerning kinds and our talk of kinds. Anscombe's remarks may give the impression that she is skeptical about their existence and reality and that she embraces some form of linguistic idealism about them. I argue that once we understand the function of so-called general terms and the use of the phrase "there is" with such terms, we can see that there is no reason to believe that kinds of things do not exist. I distinguish several questions about the reality and ideality of kinds and show that they are largely independent of one another and independent of questions about the existence of kinds. I consider a form of idealism according to which the existence of a kind of thing depends upon us. I argue that there is no reason to believe that this form of idealism is correct about kinds in general. I also consider a form of idealism according to which the essence of a kind of things depends upon us. I argue that there is no reason to believe that this form of idealism is correct about kinds in general, either. I suggest that this form of idealism rests upon a misunderstanding