Abstract

Moral realism as we know it has been primarily if not exclusively arguing for the objectivity of the moral properties of rightness and wrongness of action. This is understandable because the normative ethics, upon which moral realism as a metaethical theory reflects, has been dominated by consequentialism and deontology, both of which are primarily if not exclusively concerned about the rightness and wrongness of actions. In the last few decades, however, virtue ethics, which is primarily concerned with the goodness and badness of human persons, has become a strong rival to consequentialism and deontology but has so far not received its deserved attention from metaethicists. In this paper, as a metaethical reflection on one of the most fundamental issues of virtue ethics as a normative theory, I shall develop an agent-focused moral realism, arguing for the objectivity of the moral properties of the goodness and badness of human persons. In the process, I shall also argue how such a moral realism can relatively easily respond to a number of representative criticisms that moral anti-realists have lodged to the action-focused moral realism.