A Defense of the Given

Philosophical Review 108 (1):128 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The “doctrine of the given” that Fales defends holds that there are certain experiences such that we can have justified beliefs about their “contents” that are not based on any other beliefs, and that the rest of our justified empirical beliefs rest on those “basic beliefs.” The features of experience basic beliefs are about are said to be “given.” Fales holds that some basic beliefs are infallible, having a kind of clarity that guarantees their truth to the believer. In addition, some basic beliefs are fallible, typically due to failure to devote full attention to one’s experience.

Other Versions

edition Fales, Evan (2000) "A Defense of the Given". Noûs 34(3):468-480

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,154

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-18

Downloads
152 (#148,945)

6 months
18 (#156,046)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder
Evan Fales
University of Iowa

Citations of this work

Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.
Introspective acquaintance: An integration account.Anna Giustina - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):380-397.
Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.

View all 19 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references