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Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles
In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 328 (2013)
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Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Tooley - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 306.
Phenomenal seemings and sensible dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 270–289.
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Citations of this work
Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification.Philipp Berghofer - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):155-183.
Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness.Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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