A fregean principle

History and Philosophy of Logic 19 (3):125-135 (1998)
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Abstract

Frege held that the result of applying a predicate to names lacks reference if any of the names lack reference. We defend the principle against a number of plausible objections. We put forth an account of consequence for a first-order language with identity in which the principle holds

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Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Philip Hugly
University of California, Berkeley (PhD)

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Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Reference and generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press. Edited by Michael C. Rea.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.
Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950.Bertrand Russell - 1956 - London, England: Routledge.
Logic and Knowledge.BERTRAND RUSSELL - 1957 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (29):374.

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