Who's Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?

In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I consider a number of reasons one might think we should only accept epistemic dilemmas in our normative epistemology as a last resort and argue that none of them is compelling.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

2022

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Dilemmas, Epistemic Quasi-Dilemmas, and Quasi-Epistemic Dilemmas.Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.
Skepticism about epistemic dilemmas.Mona Simion - unknown
Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 217–231.
Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.) - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Doxastic dilemmas and epistemic blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):132-149.
Beginning in Wonder: Suspensive Attitudes and Epistemic Dilemmas.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2021 - In Nick Hughes, Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup, Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.
Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas.Deigan Michael - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2771-2796.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-01-05

Downloads
131 (#174,666)

6 months
7 (#585,014)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nick Hughes
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.
Epistemic Dilemmas Defended.Nick Hughes - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.

View all 40 references / Add more references