On Indeterminate Updating of Credences

Philosophy of Science 81 (4):537-557 (2014)
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Abstract

The strategy of updating credences by minimizing the relative entropy has been questioned by many authors, most strongly by means of the Judy Benjamin puzzle. I present a new analysis of Judy Benjamin–like forms of new information and defend the thesis that in general the rational posterior is indeterminate, meaning that a family of posterior credence functions rather than a single one is the rational response when that type of information becomes available. The proposed thesis extends naturally to all cases in which new information is traditionally handled by minimizing the relative entropy

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Citations of this work

Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem.Anubav Vasudevan - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1113-1141.

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References found in this work

On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.
Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.
A problem for relative information minimizers in probability kinematics.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):375-379.

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