Acting Freely and Being Held Responsible

Dialogue 12 (2):233-245 (1973)
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Abstract

Many people seem to find it quite impossible to doubt that if a person did not do something freely, then he can be neither praised nor blamed for doing it. This assumption is shared by people with very different views about freedom, determinism and moral responsibility. It is held by most ‘libertarians’, who, to preserve moral responsibility, reject determinism. It is held by ‘hard determinists’, who accept determinism and therefore reject moral responsibility; and it is held by ‘soft determinists’, who accept determinism, but argue that determinism does not exclude any kind of freedom that is relevant to whether a person may be held responsible.

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