The Ethical Implications of Proportioning Punishment to Deontological Desert

Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (3):495-514 (2021)
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Abstract

This article details the degree to which the ideal of punishment proportional to desert forces changes in how we think of deontological morality. More specifically, the proportionality ideal forces us to abandon the simple, text-like view of deontological moral norms, and it forces us to acknowledge that those norms are not uniformly categorical in their force.

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Michael Moore
Louisiana State University

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Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Existentialism Is a Humanism.Jean Paul Sartre - 2007 - Yale University Press.
More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right.Thomas Hurka - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (1):41-58.
Good Without God.Michael S. Moore - 1996 - In Robert P. George (ed.), Natural law, liberalism, and morality: contemporary essays. New York: Oxford University Press.

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