And From That Equal Creation: The Philosophy of Locke and the Founding of America
Dissertation, New School for Social Research (
1992)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
This dissertation argues that much of the debate concerning John Locke's influence on the American founding is mired in an insufficient grasp of Locke's own theory of nature and society. It is inadequate to see Locke as defending possessive acquisitiveness and the interests of property, narrowly, or interest-group liberalism, utilitarianism or capitalism, more broadly--as many scholars do. ;Reconsidering Locke's major works as well as recent studies that have explored his contextual setting and historical purposes, I argue that Locke left behind a philosophic world view that is considerably more coherent, comprehensive and complex than is generally conceded. ;For Locke, every individual is created equal and endowed with certain inherent duties which he or she has a responsibility to fulfill--including self-preservation and happiness. And from that "equal creation," there emerges a conception of civil government that is best captured in the principle of "equal protection." Broader than the idea of rendering impartial justice , "equal protection" cedes to government sufficient authority to protect the life, liberty, property and free pursuits of all, yet bars government from awarding special privileges or immunities to any. Against much scholarly opinion this dissertation will argue that, for Locke, government has the power to protect people and their property from invasion, but not to positively promote the welfare of any social classes--"capitalist" or "agrarian," rich or poor. ;Their clear attachment to classical republicanism notwithstanding, the Founders and Framers steadily adapted Locke's moral and philosophic outlook to their own changing circumstances. The challenges they faced during the Founding era , were all challenges posed to Locke's own theory of nature and government--as they understood it. In Jefferson's revolutionary Declaration, in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, in the Federalist and Antifederalist "papers," and in the Jeffersonian opposition during the Federalist Era, classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism could indissolubly blend, though never finally triumph