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Ignorance and Presuppositions
Mind 124 (496):1207-1219 (2015)
Abstract
I develop a class of counterexamples to Blome-Tillmann’s ‘Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism’. There are cases in which subjects are ignorant of key propositions that are inconsistent with the pragmatic presuppositions in conversational contexts in which they are discussed; in such contexts, PEC wrongly predicts the subjects to satisfy certain ‘knows’ attributionsAuthor's Profile
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Similar books and articles
Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1221-1230.
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2015-08-11
Downloads
157 (#147,149)
6 months
7 (#718,806)
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Citations of this work
What the metasemantics of know is not.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):69-82.
Knowledge and loose talk.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 272-297.
Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism and Non-ideal Contexts.William Tuckwell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1221-1230.
References found in this work
What Comes First in Dynamic Semantics: A Critical Review of Linguistic Theories of Presupposition and a Dynamic Alternative.David Beaver - 2001 - Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications.
Pragmatic Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - In Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 47--62.
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