Why diachronically emergent properties must also be salient

In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. pp. 99--116 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I criticize Bedau's definition of `diachronically emergent properties', which says that a property is a DEP if it can only be predicted by a simulation and is nominally emergent. I argue at length that this definition is not complete because it fails to eliminate trivial cases. I discuss the features that an additional criterion should meet in order to complete the definition and I develop a notion, salience, which together with the simulation requirement can be used to characterize DEPs. In the second part of the paper, I sketch this notion. Basically, a property is salient when one can find an indicator, namely a descriptive function, that is such that its fitting description shifts from one elementary mathematical object to another when the property appears. Finally, I discuss restrictions that must be brought to what can count as DFs and EMOs if the definition of salience is to work and be non trivial. I conclude that salience can complete the definition of DEPs

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,010

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
57 (#377,170)

6 months
10 (#410,099)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Synchronic and diachronic emergence.Paul Humphreys - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (4):431-442.
Appearance and Persistence as the Unity of Diachronic and Synchronic Concepts of Emergence.Vladimír Havlík - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (3):393-409.
Strengthening Weak Emergence.Nora Berenstain - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2457-2474.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Weak Emergence.Mark A. Bedau - 1997 - Noûs 31 (S11):375-399.
Downward Causation and the Autonomy of Weak Emergence.Mark Bedau - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):5–50.

Add more references