I Don't Trust Myself

Abstract

This paper presents a paradox arising from the statement “I don’t trust myself”. It demonstrates how this seemingly simple sentence leads to a situation where it contradictorily refers back to itself. Following the deduction of the initial paradox, the paper concludes by generalizing the underlying concept into a broader paradox of the same kind.

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