Gaps, Gluts, and Paradox

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 18 (sup1):273-299 (1992)
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Abstract

Consider the following sentence schema:This sentence entails that ϕ.Call a sentence which is obtained from this schema by the substitution of an arbitrary, contingent sentence, s, for ϕ, the sentence CS. Thus, This sentence entails that s.Now ask the following question: Is CS true?One sentence classically entails a second if and only if it is impossible for both the first to be true and the second to be false. Thus ‘Xanthippe is a mother’ entails ‘Xanthippe is female’ if and only if it is impossible for both ‘Xanthippe is a mother’ to be true and ‘Xanthippe is female’ to be false. CS makes a claim about a purported entailment. Thus, CS is true if and only if it is impossible for both the sentence it mentions as entailing a second to be true and the sentence it mentions as being entailed by the first to be false. In other words, CS is true if and only if it is impossible for both CS to be true and s to be false. In yet other words, CS is false if and only if it is possible for both CS to be true and s to be false.

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Citations of this work

Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
Dialetheism.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

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The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 11 (4):11-12.
The iterative conception of set.George Boolos - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):215-231.
Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.

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