Abstract

Situated historically at the beginning of the medieval period, Augustine’s thought expresses itself as one of themost influential metaphysical systems of the entire history of philosophy. Such a privileged status has oftenserved to occlude some of the more radical implications of Augustinian thought. Paradoxically, it is preciselythis radicality which has led to a resurgence of interest in Augustine, most particularly amongst twentiethcentury Continental philosophers such as Jacques Derrida. Through a careful analysis of Augustine’s thinkingconcerning morality, my paper seeks to draw out the metaphysical and epistemological values which lie at thebasis of Augustine’s disavowal of the possibility of human virtue. On my interpretation, Augustine isunequivocally arguing against the conception of ‘the freedom of the will’. Moreover, this position is, on my reading, consistently held by Augustine from his earlier to his latest writings. Here, I am arguing against the dominant view that this radical ‘immoralism’ is merely a late development in his thinking