Ancient Views. The virtues: theory and common sense in Greek philosophy

In Roger Crisp, How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1998)
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Constancy and integrity: (un)measurable virtues?Angus Robson - 2015 - Business Ethics: A European Review 24 (S2):S115-S129.
From personality disorders to the fact-value distinction.Konrad Banicki - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):274-298.

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