Does Representationalism Offer a Reply to the Knowledge Argument?

Philosophia 52 (2):221-228 (2024)
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Abstract

I agree with Torin Alter that physicalists should be a priori physicalists. I argue against his rejection of the representationalist response to the knowledge argument.

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10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3

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References found in this work

Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 29--57.
Mortal Questions.Laurence Nemirow - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (3):473.

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