Moral Judgments and Emotional Displays: A Comment

Dialogue 4 (4):536-539 (1966)
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Abstract

Professor Braybrooke has presented some interesting and novel points in support of the emotive theory in his recent paper. I imagine that his points are designed to worry objectivists or antiemotivists. In this note I will try to show that they need not worry very much.1. In addition to moral sentences and factual sentences we should pick out for comparison a class of expressive sentences whose function is to express or evince emotions. I much prefer “express” to Braybrooke's “display” here. Examples of expressive sentences are: “I am angry,” “I am afraid,” “I am furious,” “I am very pleased,” etc.

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