Naturalism and the Error Theory

Brill (forthcoming)
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Abstract

_ Source: _Page Count 12 Bart Streumer makes an interesting case for an error theory in ethics—and for an error theory for normativity more generally, but I will focus on the more restricted target. I offer a reply on behalf of naturalists in ethics. My case for resistance will involve identifying a three-fold ambiguity in his use of the term ‘guarantee’. I conclude with some observations about the implications of theories of reference for moral/ethical terms for the debate.

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Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.

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