Abstract

Logicians have always suffered from a fundamental inconsistency in explaining and analyzing Aristotelian logic due to not attending to the distinction between propositions involving relation and those involving concepts of negation. In other words, Aristotelian logic is, apparently, based on analyzing propositions into subjects and predicates, and since relation has not been considered as one of their integral components, the principles of relation are not actually a part of inferential principles, and logical issues are in a way based on relation and their related principles.This inconsistency has been such that, on the one hand, the principles and laws of relation have not been defined in our logic, and, on the other hand, since these principles have not appeared under an independent topic, those logicians who have employed them in various logical discussions, have not provided an appropriate analysis of them. Thus the logic of relation and the inferential principles underlying it have been sacrificed due to this inconsistency in traditional logic.