Abstract

This dissertation addresses issues relevant to philosophy of science as well as epistemology. I discuss the various definitions of objectivity and objective knowledge in science, and I argue for a dialectical sense of objectivity. This sense of objectivity holds that interaction between subject and object, between multiple subjects, and between subjects and their social/historical context are constitutive of the achievement of objective knowledge. Dialectical objectivity stands in contrast to other senses of objectivity, that advocate a strict separation of knower and the known in order to reduce or deny any subjective influences on knowledge claims. I clarify my notion of dialectical objectivity by comparing it to the work of other philosophers of science as well as by showing its historical roots in Hegel. Also, I apply the concept of dialectical objectivity to a case study from the history of sonar and underwater imaging technologies. The history of sonar technology involves the military-industrial complex, various countries, the academy, engineers, and popular culture. The recent shift to acoustic daylight imaging technology, which gives a new and significant role to the ambient underwater noise environment, has important philosophical implications. Acoustic daylight imaging reconceives the underwater world and its objects for sonar technicians and researchers, and holds that interaction with the underwater context produces knowledge. I argue that this combination of social interaction between various knowers, and the interaction between the knower and known, are best explicated by the dialectical sense of objectivity. Next I show how the dialectical sense of objectivity enriches the work of Philip Kitcher, clarifying his tools for characterizing scientific progress, and addressing criticism of his work with regard to the correspondence theory of truth. Finally, I argue that there are profitable connections between the dialectical sense of objectivity and the work of Sandra Harding on strong objectivity, and that those connections may provide a new common ground for mainstream and feminist philosophers of science