Doppelgänger Changes the Game

Episteme:1-26 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Thirders sometimes feel compelled to give the same answer – a credence of 1/3 – to the original and the duplicating Sleeping Beauty problem, which leads to some unwanted consequences. I will argue that they do not have to feel compelled to give the same answer, because the original and the duplicating version of the Sleeping Beauty problem are different types of decision problems. If one accepts that it is rationally permissible to give different answers to different types of decision problems, both versions do not require the same solution.

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2023-05-03

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Pavel Janda
Charles University, Prague

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References found in this work

Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection.Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
Sleeping beauty: In defence of Elga.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):292–296.
Defeating dr. evil with self-locating belief.Adam Elga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.

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