Should the Number of Overlapping Experiencers Count?

Erkenntnis:1-23 (2021)
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Abstract

According to the cohabitation account, all the persons that result from a fission event cohabit the same body prior to fission. This article concerns a problem for this account. Suppose Manuel and Jimena are suffering from an equally painful migraine. Unlike Jimena, however, Manuel will undergo fission. Assuming you have a spare painkiller, whom should you give it to? Intuitively, you have no more reason to give it to one or the other. The problem is that the cohabitation account suggests otherwise. According to the account, there are two persons cohabiting Manuel’s body, in which case you should arguably give them the pill, since doing so alleviates the pain of more beings. One response argues that the two persons cohabiting Manuel’s body share one pain. Thus, giving them the pill alleviates no more pain than giving it to Jimena, and therefore you have no more reason to do one or the other. The goal of this article is to show that this response fails.

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reprint Javier-Castellanos, A. Arturo (2023) "Should the Number of Overlapping Experiencers Count?". Erkenntnis 88(4):1767-1789

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Arturo Javier-Castellanos
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

Shared consciousness and asymmetry.Shao-Pu Kang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-17.
Overlapping minds and the hedonic calculus.Luke Roelofs & Jeff Sebo - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1487-1506.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty, The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.

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