Abstract

Professor Sallis has read the Apology, Meno, Phaedrus, Cratylus, Republic, and Sophist with the intention of elucidating Platonic responses to three questions: what is philosophy? what is logos? and what is being? His task, as he states it, is not to collect Plato’s opinions on these matters, as though such were either possible or interesting, but rather to elicit "an understanding of the manifold way in which a Platonic dialogue, by virtue of its character as a dialogue, lets whatever is at issue in it become manifest." The actions described in the dialogues embody the results of the discourses recounted therein. The first part of the book, "Socratic Logos," attempts to clarify Plato’s answer to the first question by answering the far from obvious question "who was Socrates." The answer involves three points. First, the philosopher Socrates was aware of his own ignorance as well as the implicit limits of human wisdom; this "innate distance from a total and immediate revelation of beings" is, though, what motivates and makes possible the "second sailing" in logos described in the Phaedo. Athens’ obliviousness to the Apollonian origin of Socrates’ elenchtic [[sic]] activities led to its condemnation of him as a sophist. Second, the Meno’s myth of recollection "is founded on the capacity of man, with his peculiar mixture of knowledge and ignorance, to apprehend an image as an image, i.e., to apprehend the original that shows through it." The original, though, is the whole, of which the "manys" are images; the activity proper to the philosopher is recollection of the whole and mediation between whole and part. Third, Sallis’ work on the Phaedrus links Socrates’ divine mania and philosophic eros for the beautiful to his apprehension of eide. Sallis claims that the eidos of beauty is the most proper beginning for philosophic recollection of the eide because "the beautiful is that eidos which is most manifest to man in his embodied condition." The second half of the work poses the problem of the relation of being and logos. His excellently wrought study of the Republic accomplishes what several others in his exegetic tradition have failed to deliver: Sallis shows the actual engagement in what he calls "upward-moving dianoia" which Socrates compels Glaucon to undertake. Following Klein, Sallis stresses the unity of the "divided" line, though with this novel thesis: the distinction between "opinable" and "knowable" "is not fundamentally a distinction between two kinds of things, between which some relation would subsist, but rather between two ways in which an eidos can show itself... in both cases what shows itself is the same thing." He arrives at this by not wholly satisfying analyses of the mixture of beauty and ugliness in sensible things, and by reflection on the finger-example Socrates offers, at Rep. 523, ff. Concerning the good, Sallis’ judgment is that Socrates’ inexact analogy of it to the light of the sun means that it "makes possible that sort of showing in which something can show itself as one." The course of his exegesis and argument must be studied in detail, but whatever its lacunae, it does allow a good explanation of the unity of logoi and erga in this long dialogue, of its apparent abstraction from eros, and of its central images of sun, line, and cave. Sallis’ section on the Sophist lacks the precision and sureness of his work on the Republic. He continues, though, with his emphasis on the central importance of the study of the structure of images. Image-making raises the problem of non-being, which raises the problem of being, which is resolved into a dyadic structure unsusceptible of a dianoetic or arithmetical account. This problem leads beyond counting to dialectic as the required means of showing that both true and false logos, and hence non-being itself, are within being.