Subjective Probability: The Real Thing

Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press (2002)
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Abstract

This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally uncertain observations, on expectations of the values of random variables, on de Finetti's dissolution of the so-called problem of induction, and on decision theory.

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