The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth

In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,467

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27.
Knowing enough to disagree: a new response to the moral twin earth argument.Mark van Roojen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 161-94.
Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument.Jorn Sonderholm - 2012 - Theoria 79 (1):76-88.
Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics and Metasemantics,.Mark van Roojen - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter, The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 167-186.
One‐Person Moral Twin Earth Cases.Neil Sinhababu - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):16-22.
The Methodological Implications of Reference Magnetism on Moral Twin Earth.David Mokriski - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (5):702-726.
Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth.Michael Rubin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307-327.
The intrapersonal normative twin earth argument.Jesse Hambly - 2024 - Synthese 204 (1):1-18.
Moral twin earth: The intuitive argument.Heimir Geirsson - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):115-124.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-05-30

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Quasi-Naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts.Camil Golub - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):474-500.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references